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1 Introduction
The perceived ine¢ ciency of traditional development aid, given mainly as project
aid1 , has given rise to extensive (heated) discussion (Burnside and Dollar, East-
erly, Hansen and Tarp, see Roodman (2007) for a review, Banerjee (2008),
Easterly (ed) 2008, Miguel (2009), Moyo (2009), etc.. It has also led to many
changes in aid policies. The most remarkable change has been the increased
weight given to general budget support (GBS) and programme aid2 , in general,
in many donorsaid budgets. As a consequence, the share of project aid has
fallen. E.g. the British aid agency DFID and the Nordic aid agencies have
increased the share of budget support considerably.
Mozambique and Tanzania are among the largest recipients of general budget
support (GBS) and programme aid. In 2005 the share of GBS given to Tanzania
was 40 % of total aid, while in Kenya the share was 10 % (Mokoro 2008a). In
Mozambique the share of GBS in total aid has risen from 2,7 % in 2000 (Batley
et. al. 2005) to 38 % in 2008 (Castel-Branco et. al. 2009). Naturally, this
means that the share of GBS in total central government expenditure in recipient
countries has also risen, in Mozambique from 2,7 per cent in 2000 to 16,3 per
cent in 2004 and has grown since then, in 2008 the share of GBS received by
the Mozambican government as a share of total government expenditure was
18,6 per cent (the share on non-budget grants was 24 per cent, but non-budget
grants possibly include items other than GBS).3 .
Aid has been criticized for making recipient governments accountable to
donors relieving them from accountability to their own citizens. This paper
studies theoretically the implications of the change in aid modality for citizens
welfare through its impact on government accountability to them. Among the
many reasons behind the change in aid modality is the aim of improving aid
e¤ectiveness by improving local ownership of policies. Besides providing a con-
ceptual basis for characterizing the ownership, the paper shows that the benets
of ownership are connected to the political accountability. Di¤erent aid modal-
ities are related to di¤erent degrees of accountability and ownership, but the
relationship is not straightforward. Empirically accountability seems to matter
a lot. Chauvet and Collier (2009) have shown that in developing countries higher
frequency of elections is conducive to better policies and governance. One of the
points of the paper is that di¤erent aid modalities have di¤erent implications
for the demand for accountability by the citizens. In a way the paper shows
that the concerns e.g. Moyo raises against foreign aid may be more relevant for
the project aid than for the aid given as a budget support.
1One should remember, though, that various types of aid have tried before, including
budget support to be studied here.
2Programme aid consists of GBS, sector aid programmes and balance of payments support.
3The data for government expenditure in meticals comes from Bank of Mozambique Sta-
tistics on State Budget, http://www.bancomoc.mz/index.php, data on GBS in USD from the
PAP evaluation 2008 (Castel-Branco et. al. 2008). I have used 27 meticals/USD as the
exchange rate, the World Development Indicators database did not contain the average ex-
change rate for the year 2008, in 2007 it was 26 meticals/USD, right now (August 31, 2009)
it is 27,25.
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The shifts in aid modality have been accompanied by changes also in the
aid agencies. The cooperation between donors, especially those giving GBS,
has increased. In Mozambique they have established Program Aid Partnership
(PAP) (see http://www.pap.org.mz/ ) to ease the dialogue between the Gov-
ernment of Mozambique and donors, in other countries cooperation between
donors has also increased though it has not been formalized. PAP also prepares
studies on the performance of both the government (e.g. in the form of PEFA
(public expenditure and nancial accountability) reports) and the donors in the
form of PAF (programme aid performance assessment framework). In addi-
tion, donors have established a joint database on the disbursed aid, ODAmoz
(http://www.odamoz.org.mz/reports/indexsub.asp). This improves information
on aid by both the donors and recipients. Without knowing the total amounts
of aid and their allocation the recipient governmentsability to make budget
plans is seriously impaired. In addition, project aid, which has been largely
o¤-budget in the past (e.g. Batley et.al. 2006, Mokoro (2008a)) and still is in
many countries, gives rise to unpredictable demands for budget funding (e.g.
when donors stop funding for hospitals with the expectation that they will be
taken over by the government). At the same time, individual donors cannot
make proper plans for the allocation of their own aid budget if they do not
know what other donors are doing. The model presented here captures some of
these di¤erences in aid modalities.
The switch to GBS has been criticized heavily. Some of the criticism comes
from aid organizations and NGOs whose budgets have been cut because of
reduction of project aid. Some of the criticism comes from donor politicians who
see GBS opening the door to corruption grand scale, as GBS, at least seemingly4 ,
hands over the power to allocate aid to recipient country governments. These
doubts are certainly well founded and they have raised concern also among
donors. One way to understand how e.g. PAP works is to see donors being
concerned with corruption. The experience from countries receiving GBS seems
not to be that bad. Tanzanias score in Transparency Internationals Corruption
Perception Index (the higher the number the less corruption there is) was 1.7
in 1998 and 3.0 in 2008. Mozambiques score was 3.5. in 1999 and 2.6. in 2008,
but the 1999 number, the rst available, seems to be odd, as already in 2000 the
score was 2.2 (http://www.transparency.org/). Both countries began to receive
GBS in early 2000s. During the last 9 years both countries have become less
corrupted despite the increase in the relative importance of GBS. And corruption
goes with project aid also. It has led to an increase in the wages of local skilled
people putting upward pressure on public sector wages and creating all kinds of
demands for perks by o¢ cials which reduce the e¢ ciency of the public sector
(e.g. Wangwe 2006). This is taken into account in the paper.
In the model the degree of corruption is endogenous and depends on the
aid modality, among other things. I study corruption as game of accountability
between the recipient government and citizens of the recipient country. In this
4GBS is supposed to give full ownership of aid to the recipeint government. In practice
this has not been achieved (e.g. Castel-Branco 2009) even though the local ownership has
increased.
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it di¤ers from Amegashie et. al (2007) and Cordella and DellAricchia (2006)
which study the choice of aid modality as a game between the donor and the
government. Also, I do not contrast conditional budget aid with unconditional,
like both of these papers do. As Svensson (2003) has argued, conditionality in
aid delivery has failed, it is not ex post credible. In addition, recipient countries
are sovereign states on which it is hard to impose conditionality. In my model
project aid is conditional in the sense that its use is completely determined
by the donors while the use of GBS is completely in hands of the recipient
government. I take the donor behavior to be exogenous. In this sense my model
complements Amegashie et. al. and Cordella et. al. studies. The focus on the
impacts of aid on recipient government accountability to its citizens allows me
to bring up issues like local ownership and di¤erences in ownership associated
with di¤erent aid modalities.
Another strand of literature this paper builds on is the research on aid and
the recipient government e¤ort to improve local tax collection. There is quite
a bit of evidence of a negative relationship between aid and local tax revenue
(Moss, Pettersson and van de Walle 2008 provides a survey). In the model of
this paper the incentives for local tax collection depend on the aid modality,
even though all forms of aid tend to reduce local taxation.
I will use the standard model of accountability developed by Barro (1973),
Ferejohn (1986), and Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997). The particular
version I am using is presented by Treisman (2008, ch. 7). These models are
extreme in the sense that they see political decision makers as only rent seekers.
Citizens can control their actions only indirectly, through elections if the country
is democracy or through various actions from demonstrations to coups in case
the country is not a democracy. In their basic versions these models are heavily
biased against budget support, but the major point here is to claim that even
with small modications the choice between aid modalities becomes non-trivial.
Focusing on the relationship between government accountability and aid allows
one also to sidestep the criticism levied by Castel-Branco (2008) on models of
the principal (donor) - agent (recipient) as a proper way for understanding local
ownership. The standard model of accountability is also a model of internal
rivalry over allocation of resources.
2 The basic model
2.1 A simple model of accountability
Consider an economy where all citizens are identical. They derive utility from
the consumption of a public good and a private good. The public good is
nanced by taxes. The periodic utility function of a citizen is
U = u (g) + (1  t) f (e)  c (e)
where u (g) = utility derived from the consumption of the public good, f (e)
= production of the private good, e = e¤ort used in production with c (e) =
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cost of e¤ort and f (0) = 0. The paper utilizes two specications of the utility
function, the basic one (version )adapted directly from Treisman (2008, ch. 7,
Appendix), and another version (version ) to check the robustness of some of
the conclusions. In the basic version the utility function is the following
u0 > 0; u" < 0; u0 (0) =1 (1)
e = e > 0; 0  t  tM
e = 0; t > tM
tM = threshold level tax rate: if the tax rate is higher than the threshold level
e¤ort and private production cease, below the threshold level e¤ort (and private
output) is constant. This model captures the case where production does not
react much to taxes unless taxes are very high. The specication also implies
that there is a La¤er-curve, with high enough taxes tax revenues fall. Denote
y  f (e), the cost of providing this e¤ort is c (e) = c (e) for all 0 < e  e;
c (0) = 0. Naturally it is assumed that
 
1  tM y   c (e) > 0. The tax revenue
is T (t)  ty and the maximum tax revenue T  tM  tMy.
In the -version the utility, production and e¤ort cost functions have the
following properties
u0 > 0; u" < 0; u0 (0) =1
f 0 > 0; f" < 0; f 0 (0) =1
c0; c" > 0; c (1) =1
There are two types of actors in the society: citizens and decision makers.
There is a continuum of citizens and one of them is chosen (e.g. voted) at the
beginning of period to be the political leader. After being chosen she5 will make
decisions on taxes and provision of the public good. After taxes have been
determined the citizens choose the level of e¤ort by maximizing the periodic
utility. This gives
e = e (t) ; e0 < 0
I assume that the tax revenue has the La¤er-curve property, i.e. there exists a
tax rate tM such that
T
 
tM
  T (t) : 80  t  1
T 0 > 0 : 0  t < tM
T < 0 : tM < t  1
T (t)  tf (e (t))
Obviously, for a given level of supply of the public good the periodic utility is
decreasing in the tax rate.
The intertemporal welfare of a citizen is
W c =
X

U
5 I tossed a coin to select the gender of the political leader.
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where  = subjective discount factor, 0    1.
If a citizen is elected as a political leader she becomes right away corrupted
and concerned only with maximization of her private consumption. Her in-
tertemporal welfare is thus
W l =
X

 cl
where cl = consumption of the private good by the leader. Without constraints
the leader would always set the tax rate to maximize the tax revenue and use
all of it for her private consumption, public good would not be provided at all.
But she is accountable one way or another to her fellow citizens who have the
option of not choosing her as the political leader next period. Assuming that
if a citizen is once ousted from the o¢ ce she has no possibility of returning to
power, the leader chooses the policies to maximize (in any period)
W l = c
l
 + pW
l
+1
where p = probability of re-election at the end of period  . Assuming that
citizens have full information on government actions and that they base their
actions on the welfare the government has delivered them in the current period,
it is straightforward to show that their optimal strategy (if they can coordinate
on the same action) is to choose the minimum level of periodic utility U they
request from the leader to allow her to continue in o¢ ce:
p = 1 : U  U
p = 0 : U < U
The point is now to understand how di¤erent aid modalities a¤ect this
threshold level of utility: the higher it is the more accountable the govern-
ment is. To understand the logic of determination of the threshold utility. The
leader always has the option of extracting the highest level of rent in the period
she is rst elected to o¢ ce. If she does that she is thrown out of o¢ ce for sure
and her welfare is
W l = T
 
tM

This is the level of welfare she has to be provided with if she is to be made to
choose some other policy. The government budget constraint is (assuming that
one unit of the private good is needed to produce one unit of the public good)
cl + g = T (t)
Thus, any policy (t; g) satisfying (since the society is stationary with the excep-
tion of the potential change of the leader)
W l
 
cl
  cl
1    T
 
tM
, (2)
cl  (1  )T  tM
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will (partially) discipline the leader. The citizens naturally want to achieve the
highest possible welfare. The welfare with (some) discipline in the government is
obviously higher than when the government is ill-disciplined. Thus, the citizens
optimal action is to set the threshold level of utility U as high as possible but
still keeping the government interested in re-election. Thus, () has to hold as
an equality:2
cl = (1  )T  tM (3)
If the leader is very far-sighted ( is close to unity) then the possibility to change
the leader achieves perfect accountability. With imperfect accountability the
policies are chosen to maximize
U = u (g) + (1  t) y   c (e)
subject to
cl = (1  )T  tM (4)
cl + g = T (t)
These are the policies the citizens know they can require and still keep the
government (relatively) disciplined, this is what accountability means. Thus,
the solution gives U . Substitution of these into the citizens periodic utility
gives
U = u (g) + y   c (e)  T (t) = (5)
u (g) + y   c (e)  (1  )T  tM  g
This is maximized for a level of public good supply satisfying
u0 (g) = 1, (6)
g = u; 1 (1)  go
This is the optimal policy chosen by the leader if there exists a tax rate t  tM
such that
T (t) = (1  )T  tM+ go  T  tM (7)
or
t =
(1  ) tMy + go
y
 tM (8)
If not, then the optimal policy is to set t = tM and set the supply of public
goods so that the accountability of the political leader is still achieved
g = T
 
tM
  (1  )T  tM = T  tM (9)
I call this case as the case of an extremely corrupted government. The
government so corrupted that in its greed it sets the highest possible tax rate
to grab funds, it is funding constrained. Note that this type of a "credit
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constraint" holds the more likely to less far-sighted the leader is (the higher the
rents she requires to behave) and the higher the marginal utility of public goods
is.
In the -version the government is never funding constrained in the sense
above. The optimal tax rate maximizes
u
 
T (t)  (1  )T  tM+ (1  t) f (e (t))  c (e (t))
The optimal tax rate (I assume 2nd order conditions to hold) is given, using the
envelope theorem, by the equation
u0 (g)T 0   f (e (t)) = 0, (10)
u0 (g) =
f (e (t))
T 0
=
f (e (t))
f (e (t)) + tf 0e0
> 1
Taxation creates now a deadweight loss constraining the supply of the public
good.
2.2 Accountability with project aid
Assume now that the society receives foreign aid in the form of project aid.
Since much of this aid is in the form of building hospitals and schools one can
model the project aid as provision of public goods nanced by funds not in the
government budget. Let the total aid be A. Then the citizens periodic utility
is
u (A+ g) + (1  t) y   c (e)
The leaders accountability constraint is still given by (3). Thus, the citizens
welfare is given by (in analogy with (5) using (4)):
u (A+ g) + y   c (e)  (1  )T  tM  g
Assuming that A < go the optimal supply of public good by the leader satises
u0 (A+ g) = 1, (11)
gPA = go  A
where go is given by (6). Thus, the government budget constraint is now
cl + gPA = T (t),
cl = T (t)  go +A
For this to be a feasible policy, there must exist a t  tM such that
T (t) = cl + gPA , (12)
t =
(1  ) tMy + go  A
y
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With this the citizens periodic welfare is now
U = u (go) + y   c (e)  (1  )T  tM  go +A (13)
Comparing (7) and (12) with each other one sees that project aid (in this form)
increases political accountability. First, it makes possible to satisfy the leaders
accountability constraint with a smaller tax rate: less tax revenue is needed to
cover the optimal supply of public good. Or to put it other way, project aid
makes it more likely that the optimal level of public good can be provided.
The lower tax rate directly increases citizens welfare. Secondly, project aid
increases directly the citizens welfare as less of tax revenue needs to be allocated
to the supply of the public good. This means that aid is in e¤ect a direct
income transfer to the citizen: aid does not have any e¤ect on the accountability
constraint with the implication that less of tax revenue has to be given as a
transfer to the leader. Finally, aid does not have any direct impact on the
supply of the public good.
These positive e¤ects derive from the implicit assumption that aid is per-
fectly fungible: even when given as direct project aid, which is o¤-budget, the
government can change its budget allocations to reect the aid allocation, with
fungibility o¤-budget aid is in this sense on-budget, but the government cannot
directly grab the aid. The positive impact of project aid is due to the fact that
the only way the government can benet from it is an indirect way, change its
own policy. The empirical evidence on aid fungibility is that it is fungible but
only partially. In this set-up aid is not fungible at all if (12) is not satised for
any t  tM . In this case the government is extremely corrupted and the public
expenditure is given by (analogously to (9))
g = tMy (14)
implying the supply of the public good
A+ tMy
and the citizens welfare
u
 
A+ tMy

+
 
1  tM y   c (e)
Aid increases public good supply one to one and improves welfare only through
increasing the supply of the public good. As long as A + tMy < go, @U@A > 1.
We study below the case when A+ tMy  go.
In the -version the tax rate giving the optimal citizens threshold welfare
is obtained by maximizing
u
 
A+ T (t)  (1  )T  tM+ (1  t) f (e (t))  c (e (t)) (15)
with the rst order condition:
u0
 
A+ T (t)  (1  )T  tMT 0 (t)  f (e (t)) = 0
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Thus, part of the increase in aid is used to reduce tax rate, only part of it is
used to reduce the supply of public good by the leader, thus aid is only partially
fungible. Aid denitely increases the utility the citizens are able to reach and
thus increases government accountability.
Thus, in this basic version project aid improves accountability, regardless of
whether it is fungible or not. Finally, note also that both of the cases studied
are consistent with the empirical observation that higher aid is associated with
smaller government tax revenues. But this is not because aid directly reduces
the incentives to collect local taxes but because aid allows citizens to make the
government more accountable.
2.3 Accountability with general budget support
Assume next that aid is given as a transfer of funds directly to the government
budget. In this case aid has a direct impact on the accountability constraint
as now the leader can use the aid in addition to tax revenue for her private
consumption: without re-election the highest level of welfare the leader can
obtain for the single period she is in power is
W l = T
 
tM

+A
where A again is the aid received by the society. In this case aid is equivalent
to a rent from some natural resource like diamonds. Thus, the accountability
and government budget constraints are now6
cl = (1  ) T  tM+A (16)
cl + g = T (t) +A
The citizens periodic utility is now
u (g) + y   c (e)  (1  ) T  tM+A  g
The public good supply maximizing this is clearly go if there again exists a tax
rate smaller than the revenue maximizing rate such that the feasibility constraint
t =
go + (1  )T  tM  A
y
(17)
is satised. Aid again makes it more likely that the optimal level of public good
can be supplied with lower tax rate, but the e¤ect is smaller than with project
aid: direct budget support increases the rents the leaders can directly demand.
Thus, only part of aid, determined by the discount factor, can be used to reduce
taxes. In this case the citizens welfare is
U = u (go) + y   c (e)  (1  )T  tM  go + A (18)
6Note that I am here assuming aid to continue forever. The same assuption was implicitly
made above. Clearly, dropping the assumption would make it more costly to citizens to
provide incentives to leaders to behave.
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with tax rate determined by the solution to (17). Increasing aid increases welfare
and thus accountability but the impact of higher aid is smaller than with project
aid as higher aid also increases the rents the political leaders are able to capture.
The di¤erence arises from the fact that budget support can be directly captured
by the government while it can capture o¤-budget aid only indirectly.
In case the government is extremely corrupted the public good supply is
given by
g = 

T
 
tM

+A

which, for the same total amount of aid, is smaller than with project aid. Again,
switching aid from project aid to budget aid keeping the total amount of funds
constant is welfare reducing, even though in both modalities welfare is higher
with aid than without aid.
Since in the -version welfare is determined by nding the tax rate maxi-
mizing
u
 
T (t) +A  (1  ) T  tM+A+ (1  t) f (e (t))  c (e (t)) = (19)
u
 
T (t) + A  (1  )T  tM+ (1  t) f (e (t))  c (e (t))
it is clear (comparing this to (15)) that welfare is also in this case lower with
GBS than with project aid of the same size.
The standard model of accountability studied in this section, when extended
to allow external inow of aid to the society, predicts that aid given as budget
support reduces political accountability relative to the accountability obtained
with project aid.
3 Why budget support can outperform project
aid?
The model of the previous section is heavily biased against general budget sup-
port. There was nothing corresponding to national ownership the lack of which
is emphasized in the literature criticizing project aid, no coordination problems
existed with the national supply and donor supply of the public goods, there
was no corruption associated with the project aid, etc. In this section I will
look at some of these e¤ects. Finally, it is also shown that budget support gives
better incentives to citizens to make government accountable than project aid.
In fact it is shown that increasing project aid reduces these incentives and there
is an upper bound for the incentives, while increasing budget support always
increases the incentives.
3.1 Aid and ownership
National ownership is usually dened as national sovereignty in allocating re-
sources. Project aid is quite often criticized for reducing ownership. Donors
have been claimed e.g. to fund their own pet projects regardless of the local
10
needs. The model above is not suitable to study the ownership issue as there
was no genuine issue of allocating tax revenue between various uses. To get
to the ownership problem, assume that there are two public goods and assume
that the citizens periodic utility function with only national supplies of public
goods is
U = u (g) + v (h) + (1  t) y   c (e)
The government budget constraints and the accountability constraints are changed
accordingly.
3.1.1 Ownership and project aid
Consider rst the ownership with project aid. Assume that the donor(s) have
funded the production of A units of g and B units of h. Then the citizens
welfare is
u (A+ g) + v (B + h) + (1  t) y   c (e)
The accountability constraint of the political leader is still given by (3). With
it, if both of the public goods are undersupplied by donors, i.e.
u0 (A) ; v0 (B) > 1 (20)
and the government is only mildly corrupted, i.e. faces no funding constraint
then we are back in the same situation as above: aid is perfectly fungible, it
crowds out fully local funding of the public goods but both public goods are
optimally supplied. Aid reduces the tax rate and is partly transferred to the
citizens as de facto lump sum transfer.
The situation may change if the government faces a funding constraint. As-
sume that the donor allocation of funds is both undersupplied and ine¢ ciently
allocated, e.g. wlog
u0 (A) > v0 (B) > 1
i.e. there is a larger need to expand the supply of g than h. The political
leader would then use all of increased funding to expand the supply of g. If the
feasibility constraint it faces is severe enough then even with national supply of
public goods it still is the case that
u0 (A+ g) > v0 (B) > 1 (21)
and even the constrained e¢ ciency in the supply of the public good is not
achieved. The local supply of the public good is given by
g = tMy
and welfare is given by
u
 
A+ tMy

+ v (B) +
 
1  tM y   c (e)
Aid is again not fungible and aid improves welfare by helping the government
to increase the supply of the most needed public good. But this holds only for
11
part of aid, aid given to provide the other public good increases the distortion
in the allocation of funds to the production of the public goods.
With the -version the optimal tax rate and allocation of public funds can
be derived by maximizing
u
 
A+ T (t)  (1  )T  tM  h+ v (B + h)+ (1  t) f (e (t))  c (e (t)) (22)
Clearly, if at the optimum
u0
 
A+ T (t)  (1  )T  tM > v0 (B)
none of the local public funds will be allocated to the production of the good
h. Interestingly, now part of aid, B, does not have any e¤ect on the optimal
tax rate, only the aid given to the supply of the public good provided more
suboptimally has an e¤ect7 . The aid given to the supply of h, even though
it increases welfare, does not improve accountability in a way at all as it has
no e¤ect on government policies. This is analogous to the case of GBS in the
previous section, only a part of the aid has an impact on the accountability.
But with overall undersupply of public goods project aid denitely improves
ownership as it makes it possible to reallocate resources in a way that more
closely is aligned with the citizens preferences. Full alignment may not be
possible, however.
An even more drastic case of loss of accountability is the one where donors
have overfunded8 some of their pet projects. This case prevails when wlog
u0 (A) > 1 > v0 (B)
Below in the subsection dealing with corruption and project aid I present a
model explaining how this type of a situation can arise. When this holds, per-
fect ownership cannot be achieved even when the government faces no funding
constraint: the optimal policy would be to reduce the supply of h, but this is
not in the hands of the national government. Aid allocated to the production of
h does not have any other e¤ect on citizenswelfare than directly through v (B),
the indirect e¤ects through the government budget constraint and accountabil-
ity constraint do not arise. Thus, in case of no government funding constraint
the citizens welfare is
u (go) + v (B) + y   c (e)  (1  )T  tM  go +A
where the tax rate satises the accountability constraint (12). Thus, only a part
of the aid now is transferred back to citizens as reduced taxes. The rst of these
e¤ects is analogous to the case with GBS in the previous section. Similar e¤ects
7This result crucially depends on the assumption that public goods enter additively sepa-
rately in the utility function.
8This is just a relative oversupply of a public good, relative to the circumstances prevailing
in the society. Thus, donors, making decisions without information what other donors or
the government are doing, may e.g. build scholls or hospitals in a certain region in excess of
current needs, etc.
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are observed in case where the government faces the funding constraint. In fact
this case is formally similar to the case where there is general undersupply of
public goods and the government faces a tight funding constraint. Obviously,
the -version also produces analogous results.
3.1.2 Ownership and general budget support
Assume now that all aid is given as general budget support, denote the amount
of aid by D. Then, if the government is mildly corrupted the situation is like
in the previous section except for the fact that now a full optimality in the
structure of public good provision is achieved: As can be easily shown, in this
case the optimality condition
u0 (go) = 1 = v0 (ho)
holds. Budget aid thus achieves full ownership. But the level of welfare can
still be lower still than with project aid, unless the aid allocation is severely
distorted.
With distorted project aid allocation GBS can outperform project aid even
though it leads to larger rent extraction than project aid. This is both because
with GBS the public expenditure allocation is at least constrained optimal,
and taxes are reduced by the total amount of aid, since without the funding
constraint the tax rate with GBS is
t =
(1  )T  tM+ go + ho   D
y
If the government is extremely corrupted then the GBS achieves the constrained
optimum
u0 (g) = v0 (h) > 1
GBS also prevents completely the oversupply of some public goods, as the gov-
ernment always has full incentives to allocate government expenditure e¢ ciently
given the accountability constraint and with GBS it has the possibility to do
it. With a binding funding constraint the aggregate local public expenditure is
given by
E = 

T
 
tM

+D

and its allocation is determined to maximize
u
 


T
 
tM

+D
  h+ v (h) +  1  tM y   c (e)
with the (possibly constrained) optimum
u0 (g) = v0 (h)
With the -version the e¤ects are similar, GBS prevents the misallocation of
the supply of public goods, as the tax rate and the allocation of public funds
are given as the maximands of
u
 
T (t) + D   (1  )T  tM  h+ v (h) + (1  t) f (e (t))  c (e (t)) (23)
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Compare (22) with (23): With GBS the full amount of aid always has an impact
on the tax rate (reducing it) while with the project aid only a part of aid
may have this e¤ect. If D = A + B, then the welfare ranking of di¤erent aid
modalities is not clear anymore. Budget support achieves full national ownership
and the allocation of public expenditure always achieves at least constrained
e¢ ciency. Project aid may (but need not) fail to achieve any e¢ ciency criterion
in allocation. Thus, both ownership and accountability can be larger with GBS
than with project aid.
3.2 Project aid and costs of coordination
Among the costs associated with project aid are the costs of coordination (e.g.
Knack and Rahman 2008, Mokoro (2008a,b), Svensson 2008). Funds are wasted
as numerous donors independently make decisions on the projects to be funded
resulting in e.g. duplication of e¤ort. At the same time there are costs of co-
ordination between the donors and aid recipient governments. The government
usually lacks information on the project aid and on individual projects. With
pure GBS, if no project aid is given, these costs are avoided. In this subsection
I study how the costs of coordination a¤ect the implications of project aid on
government accountability.
Let us return to the model with only one public good. Assume that the costs
of supplying g units of the public good to the government are
J (g;A) = g + j (g;A) ; jg; jA > 0 (24)
where j (g;A) = costs of coordination. I assume that these costs are increasing
in both g and A. The larger the number of projects donors fund the harder
it is for the government to coordinate its actions with donor actions, and the
more it wants to supply the public good on its own the harder the coordination
problems again are. These costs can be interpreted as the total costs needed to
provide an e¤ective supply of g units of the public good. Similarly, let
 (A) ; 0 < 0  1 (25)
denote the e¤ective supply of the public good by the donors. If 0 < 1, then
there are costs of coordination. If the function is concave, then the ine¢ ciency
increases with the number of projects. For simplicity I ignore from (25) the
government actions as a¤ecting the ine¢ ciency in donor actions.
Since the project aid does not directly enter the government budget the rents
required by the leaders to behave well are again
cl = (1  )T  tM
and the government budget constraint, including the accountability constraint,
is (with (24))
cl + J (g;A) = T (t)
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Consider the case where the government is not funding constrained. Then the
optimal supply of the public good by the government is the maximand to
u ( (A) + g) + y   c (e)  (1  )T  tM  J (g; a) (26)
characterized by the FOC
u0 ( (A) + g)  Jg (g;A) = 0 (27)
From this one can solve the optimal supply of the public good by the local
government, g (A), with
dg
dA
=  u"
0   JgA
u"  Jgg
If Jgg, JgA > 0, then aid is at least partly fungible,
dg
dA < 0. If Jgg > JgA, then
 1 < dgdA < 0. Also, from (27) one knows that, since Jg > 1, that the optimal
supply of the public good is smaller than without the coordination costs. Finally,
with the government supply decision the tax rate is given by
t =
(1  )T  tM+ J (g (A) ; A)
y
(28)
If g0 (A) < 0, then increased aid reduces the tax rate if Jgg0 + JA < 0. This
e¤ect is made smaller by the partial fungibility of aid and the increased costs of
coordination.
Compare now (28) and (18) with the expressions of pure GBS when the gov-
ernment does not face funding constraint, (17) and (26). Without coordination
costs project aid performed better than GBS because with the same amount of
total aid given the supply of the public good was the same but project aid led
to a larger reduction of the tax rate as GBS. With fungibility the total amount
of aid was used to reduce the tax rate while with GBS part of aid is used in
rents to the political leader and the tax reduction was not as big. With coor-
dination costs of project aid the impacts on the tax rate are now qualitatively
similar in bot aid modalities and the supply of the public good is now larger
with GBS than with project aid. These results generalize to the case of funding
constraints and to the -version of the preferences. Thus, it is possible that
with the costs of coordinating the project aid GBS leads to better countability
even if the rents captured by the political leaders are larger with it than with
project aid: the rents captured in the model version of this subsection are the
same as in section 2 above.
3.3 Corruption and project aid
The superiority of project aid relative to GBS shown in section 2 depended
partly on the assumption that there is no corruption associated with project
aid. This does not accord with the facts and needs to be taken into account
when comparing the aid modalities. The corruption associated with the project
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aid need not be of the traditional form of handing out bribes to get things done
or to avoid some regulations. E.g. Wangwe (2006) claims that the costs arising
from government o¢ cials attending all kinds of seminars arranged by the donors
are huge both in terms of lost working days and higher pay demands. Also,
project implementation needs cooperation with local o¢ cials whose incomes are
increased by all kinds of fees and extra salaries provided by the donors (e.g.
Mokoro 2008 a,b).
One way to model the corruption or just "excessive budgets" associated with
the project aid is to use the theory of bureaus and sponsors developed in Moene
(1986). A more proper account requires modelling of the hierarchy of central
government, line ministries and local governments, but we assume here that all
excess budgets or bribes are received by the political leadership. Assume now
that a donor is willing to provide a public good with a willingness to pay (net
of the opportunity cost)
D (A) ; D0 > 0; D" < 0
To provide this the donor has to use the services of local government o¢ cials.
Only these o¢ cials know the true costs of providing these services, they are
C (A) ; C 0; C" > 0. The o¢ cials care about the aid itself but they also want to
get rents from providing their services, their utility function is
w (A;S   C (A))
where S C (A) = the rents the o¢ cials earn with S = the funding received from
the donor, or the excess budget they receive. The o¢ cials are assumed to know
the donors willingness to pay for the public good. Given that the o¢ cials know
the donors willingness to pay they can extract the whole "consumer surplus"
from the donor by presenting proper cost estimates. If the o¢ cials are successful
in doing so, then their welfare is
w (A;D (A)  C (A))
The optimal supply of the public good from the o¢ cials point of view is the
solution to
wA + wS (D
0   C 0) = 0 (29)
Clearly, at this optimum D0 C 0 < 0 as wA, wS > 0: the o¢ cials want the donor
to supply more of the public good than is optimal from the donor point of view,
the donor optimality condition is D0   C 0 = 0. But the donor cannot control
for this as it does not know the true costs. The o¢ cials can get what they want
by presenting the donor with cost function bC (A) having the properties
D
 bA = bC  bA
D0
 bA = bC 0  bA
Here bA = the supply of the public good desired by the o¢ cials (the solution
to (29)). Since this larger than the supply optimal for donors if they knew the
16
true costs, the marginal costs declared by the o¢ cials must be lower than the
true marginal costs bC 0  bA < C 0  bA
while the total costs must exceed the true costs (since D0 > 0 and the o¢ cials
extract all the rents) bC  bA > C  bA
This can be achieved e.g. by inating the xed costs of providing the services
(e.g. school construction costs). It has been observed that in projects costs
are heavily biased towards capital expenditure (Nilsson 2004). The story here
provides one reason why this is the case and associates it with rent extraction
by the recipient governments. Indeed, one of the by-products of the project has
been that they have increased the incomes of the government o¢ cials (Mokoro
2008a). Also, seminars are one way of inating the xed costs. The total rents
earned by government o¢ cials from this donor are
bC  bA  C  bA
and the total returns from all donors
R  n
h bC  bA  C  bAi
assuming all donors to be identical, n = the number of donors. All donors are
induced to provide, from their own point of view, excessive amount of the public
good. If these are donorspet projects, i.e. they value them more highly than
locals do, u0 < D0, the supply may be excessive from the local point of view.
This is one way to explain why with project aid one may end up to the situation
where some public goods are supplied more than e¢ ciency judged by the local
valuation requires, as analyzed above in this section.
Consider now the public sector as a whole. Then these rents collected from
the project aid end up to rents required by the political leaders in fashion similar
to GBS
cl = (1  ) T  tM+R
Thus, the di¤erence between project aid and GBS studied in Section 2 dimin-
ishes but does not disappear altogether if GBS equals the total amount of project
aid (n bC  bA equals the total project aid supplied by the donors), but the sup-
ply of the public good may be more ine¢ cient with project aid than with GBS.
Thus, there again exists a genuine trade-o¤ between the project aid and GBS.
3.4 Demand for accountability
Above it has been assumed that citizens do demand accountability from the
government. If there are some costs of doing so (including the problems of col-
lective action) then the benets from getting government to become accountable
must be large enough. How does aid a¤ect these benets?
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With project aid, using the simplest model above, the net gain from having
an accountable government is (assuming the government is not funding con-
strained), using (13)
Bpa =

u (go) + y   c (e)  (1  )T  tM  go +A  (30)
u (A) +
 
1  tM y   c (e)
where, obviously, it is assumed that A < go. Without accountability the gov-
ernment uses the all maximum tax revenue for its own consumption and does
not contribute at all to the supply of the public good, hence the second term.
But then
@Bpa
@A
= 1  u0 (A) < 0
i.e. increased aid reduces the benets from accountability. Consider what hap-
pens when A ! go. In the limit
Bpa = tMy (31)
Thus, if aid provides the optimum amount of the public good, citizens can
hope from hope to get through accountability only the return of the extra tax
revenue captured by the government without accountability. The accountability
problem is transformed to a conict in distribution of income, not to a conict
over broader policy packages. When A > go, aid does not have any impact on
incentives to make the government accountable. With fungible project aid the
government can transform aid to increase in government revenue only as long
as it is optimal for itself to provide some of the public good: it reduces its own
supply when aid expands. The benets from accountability are still given by
(31). Another way to express this is to say that there is a limited capacity to
absorb project aid, at least when it comes to gains from accountability.
If aid is given as budget support then the benets from accountability are
Bbs =

u (go) + y   c (e)  (1  )T  tM  go + A 
u (0) +
 
1  tM y   c (e)
and thus, always
@Bbs
@A
=  > 0
Larger aid in budget support always improves incentives to demand account-
ability, as the aid is always part of government revenue. If it does not want to
use it to expand the supply of public goods it can be handed back (or part of
it) to citizens and it has to do this because of accountability constraint. Thus
aid modality matters for the incentives of the citizenship to make government
accountable, project aid always reduces incentives, budget support increases in-
centives. These results hold also for the more complicated versions of the model
(extremely corrupted government and the -version of the utility function).
In a deeply aid-dependent society aid matters for all aspects of social life (see
e.g. Castel-Branco 2008). The results here indicate that also the aid modality
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can be important, the modality may matter for the whole operation of the
political mechanism. Project aid makes citizens politically dull as their actions
do not actually matter that much, and the e¤ect is the stronger the more aid
is given. Budget support increases the gap between what can be achieved and
what is achieved without accountability, its use can be potentially determined
by the citizens through a working democratic system.
4 Concluding comments
The paper has argued with the help of a simple model of government account-
ability that project support may be inferior to general budget support even
when the political leadership is extremely corrupt. As such GBS generates
rents equivalent to resource rents and tends to increase rents required by the
leaders reducing accountability, but there are many countervailing e¤ects. First,
GBS is consistent with local ownership even if it allows leaders to earn higher
rents as, net of rents, leaders want to and can allocate the budget as e¢ ciently
as possible between various uses. The same is not true of project aid, as the
leaders may not be able to achieve e¢ cient allocation even if they want. This
can be the case regardless of whether the government is funding constrained
or not if the allocation of aid by donors is not consistent with e¢ ciency. One
mechanism creating ine¢ cient allocation is extraction of rents by government
o¢ cials from donors providing project aid, as the way to create rents is to in-
ate aid budgets above the true costs. And this leads to the result that also
project aid creates rents and allows political leaders to require higher rents to
make their decisions more aligned with citizenspreferences. The nal result of
the paper is that higher project aid worsens incentives of citizens to demand for
accountability, higher budget support improves these incentives.
The model of accountability used here is is based on the standard account-
ability model. The model assumes political leaders to be completely corrupt,
giving no weight to citizenswelfare unless made to do so by the threat of re-
ducing the leaders time in o¢ ce. In future work one should dispose of this
assumption and utilize models where the political leaders are ordinary citizens,
who, even if they make purely selsh decisions, have preferences more or less
aligned with their fellow citizens. Also one may want to endogenize the political
structure. The model is heavily biased against GBS but the point has been
to show that with empirically relevant modications GBS may work better in
theory at least. But the great benet of the model is that it shows how internal
struggles over the distribution of income matters for the benets from aid. It
also shows how aid modality matters for the structure of the political system.
naturally, the model is too simple to capture many relevant aspects of internal
conicts, to get there one would have to consider the heterogeneity of interests
among the citizens and model the pressure groups. Also, to get to a better
modelling of implementation and incentives of accountability one should model
the formation and activities of political and civil organizations.
More at the grassroots level, one should go deeper in the structure of govern-
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ment decision making. The few existing studies on the experiences from GBS
(Nilsson 2004, IDD 2006, Mokoro 2008a) have pointed out that much of the
project aid is (or has been in the past9) o¤-budget reducing the information
central governments has at its disposal complicating the decision making at the
central level. One of the reasons for this is that line ministries which are aware
of the projects and have received funding from donors have an incentive to hide
the information as they fear that their funding from the central government
would be cut. Local governments have the same incentives of hiding the infor-
mation. Getting project aid to budget is to make it at least partly analogous
to GBS. That is one of the reasons why donors giving project aid have started
to provide the central government information about the project aid they are
giving.
The most important next modelling step is to endogenize the donor behavior
to study e.g. the accountability of donors to e.g. parliaments funding them.
This would be a way to understand why the donor interests are not fully aligned
with the recipient country interests, explaining why the question of ownership is
important. Also, the model used in the paper has considered pure project aid,
determined by donor decisions alone, and pure budget support the allocation
of which is determined by the recipient alone. The reality in both cases is
somewhere between these to extremes, and can be solved only by endogenizing
the donor behavior. What the model shows, though, is that the policy space
available for the recipient country policy makers matters, and this is the crucial
distinction made in the paper. Also the model shows, how aid reducing the
policy space restricts incentives by citizens to make the government accountable,
or to put it the other way, the blame from policies can be shifted to donors (see
e.g. Castel-Branco 2008).
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